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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM TIiE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
In U. S. Bobbin and Shuttle Co. v. Thissell, 137 Fed. i,
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit,
Acts decides that where an employer sent to an em-
Constituting ployee a check for wages, and a statement show-
ing the rate at which they were computed, which was a
matter in dispute between them, and a receipt in full to a
date given to be signed and returned, directing that, if the
account was not found correct, the check be returned, the
acceptance and cashing of the check created an accord and
satisfaction of the claim, and also determined the employee's
wages for the future in the absence of further contract,
although he did not return the receipt, but assumed to hold
the matter open for future consideration. See also Nassoiy
v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326.
BANKRUPTCY.
A rule of very practical importance in connection with
bankruptcy proceedings is laid down by the United States
Sate of District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania, In re Sax-
Property: ton Furnace Company, 136 Fed. 697, where it
Notice is held that to authorize an order for the sale
of a bankrupt's property free of liens, the record should
show affirmatively that every creditor whose lien will be
discharged has received notice of the application therefor,
and a general statement by the referee that such notice
has been given is insufficient.
The United States District Court, D. New Hampshire,
decides In re Pcasley, 137 Fed. I9O, that in the absence of
Secured Claim any authoritative state decision or statute gov-
erning the case, a vendee under a contract for
the purchase of land, who has recorded his bond for a deed
and paid the purchase money, on the bankruptcy of the
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vendor without having conveyed, is entitled to prove his
claim as one secured by an equitable lien on the land.
In Upson v. Morris Bank, 92 N. Y. Supp. iioi, the
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First De-
Insolvency partment) decides that on an issue as to whether
a debtor was insolvent, within the meaning of
the Bankrupt Act, at the time that he gave a certain trans-
fer, the fact that late in the afternoon of the same day he
conveyed nearly all his remaining property, thereby render-
ing himself insolvent within the meaning of the Bankrupt
Act, did not, on the theory that fractions of a day are not
to be considered, render him insolvent at the time of the
former transfer.
The United States Supreme Court decides in Guilford
B. Keppel v. Tiffn Savings Bank, 25 S. C. R. 443, that a
Preference creditor of a bankrupt, who has in good faith
received a preference voidable under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, Section 67e, solely because given within
four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and who has in good faith retained the preference until de-
prived thereof by the judgnrient of a court in a suit by the
trustee, still may prove the debt so voidably preferred, not-
withstanding the provision of Section 579 that "the claims
of creditors who have received preferences shall not be
allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their prefer-
ences." Compare Pirie v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 182
U. S. 438.
In Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, decides that rents
Res which the bankrupt had agreed to pay at times
subsequent to the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy do not constitute a provable claim under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, because they are not a "fixed
liability . . . absolutely owing at the time of the filing of
the petition against him," and because they do not constitute
an existing demand; but both the existence and the amount
of the possible future demand are contingent upon future
events, such as default of lessee, re-entry of lessor, and
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assumption by trustee, so that they neither form the basis
of an unliquidated nor of a liquidated provable claim. See
and compare Deane v. Caldwell, 127 Mass. 242.
It is decided by the United States District Court, N. D.
Iowa, In re Clifford, 136 Fed. 475, that the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898,. Section 67d, providing that liens
given or accepted in good faith, and not in con-
templation of, or in fraud of, the act, and for a present con-
sideration, which have been recorded according to law, shall
not be affected by the act, is satisfied as to recording if the
instruments be recorded before commencement of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. See Bernhisel v. Firinan, 89 U. S. 17o.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Cir-
cuit, decides in Gorman v. Wright, 136 Fed. 164, that the
Secured Bankruptcy Act of 1898, providing that the
-Claims term " secured creditor" shall include a creditor
who has security for his debt on the property of the bank-
rupt of a nature assignable under the act, or who owns such
a debt for which some indorser, surety, or other person sec-
ondarily liable for the bankrupt has such security, a creditor,
in order to be " secured," must either hold security against
the property of the bankrupt himself, or be secured by the
individual obligation of another who holds such security.
In Sundling v. Willey, 103 N. V. 38, the Supreme Court
of South Dakota decides that a promise to pay "as soon
as possible," made after a discharge in bank-
ruptcy, is not a conditional promise, and is not,
as such, insufficient to support an action on the original
demand. Compare Norton v. Shepard, 48 Conn. 141.
A decision of great practical importance is reached by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Daniel L. Holden
Fire v. J. A. Stratton, 25 S. C. R. 656, -where it is
Insurance held that the exemption of policies of life in-
surance under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Section 6, where
they are exempted from execution by the state law, is not
qualified by the proviso in Section 7oa of that act (which
vests the trustee with the title of the bankrupt, "except in
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so far as it is to property which is exempt," to certain
enumerated classes of property), that a bankrupt having an
insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to
himself, his estate, or his personal representatives may pre-
vent the policy from passing to the trustee by paying such
surrender value. See Steele v. Buel, 44 C. C. A. 287.
BILLS AND NOTES.
The Supreme Court of Iowa decides in City Deposit Bank
Co. of Columbus, Ohio, v. Grecn, 103 N. W. 96, that a
Bona-iFde bank, by discounting a note for a depositor, and
Purchaser giving him credit for the proceeds on his de-
posit account, does not, so long as the deposit is not drawn
out, become a bona-fide purchaser, so as to be protected
against infirmities in the paper. "By giving credit to the
indorser of the note on his deposit account the bank in
effect agrees to pay him that amount of money on demand
by check or order, and parts with nothing of value.
When it receives notice of defences to the note, it is still
in a situation, provided the amount thus credited has re-
mained undrawn by the depositor, to return the note to him
and cancel the credit." See also Manufacturers' Nat. Bank
v. Newell, 71 Wis. 309.
In Harnett v. Hoidrege, lO3 N. E. 277, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska decides that persons who write their
Indorsers: names in blank on the back of a promissory note
Parol payable to the order of the maker, which is in-
Evidence dorsed by such maker and afterwards delivered
to a third person, in the absence of any special agreement
to the contrary become liable thereon as indorsers and not
as joint makers, and their liability cannot be varied by parol
evidence. It is further held that evidence of a custom or
course of dealing previously pursued by the maker with
regard to other notes of a like character is not admissible
for the purpose of showing inferentially that the indorsers
were joint makers and thus change and enlarge their lia-
bility. Compare Biglow v. Colton, 13 Gray, 309.
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CARRIERS.
In view of the difficulty experienced by a shipper of goods
in securing evidence as to how damage to them or loss of
Loss o them may have occurred, legal presumptions
oood : in reference to such facts become very impor-
Presumption tant. The presumptions as to damage have been
fairly well worked out. In Everett v. Norfolk and S. R.
Co., 5o S. E. 557, the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
dealing with the presumption in cases where goods received
by a carrier for transportation are lost, holds that the pre-
sumption is that the loss occurred through negligence.
Compare Mitchell v. Railroad, 124 N. C. 236.
COAL LANDS.
With two judges dissenting, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania decides in Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Alle-
Support gheny Nat. Bank, 6o Atl. 924, that where adefendant owned coal under land, the surface
of which was owned by another, and conveyed the coal to
a third person, giving an obligation to indemnify the grantee
for any damage resulting to the surface of the land by
reason of skilful and careful mining, such third person was
not compelled under the agreement, in operating the coal,
to leave supports for the surface, but where he exercised
skill in his mining operation he could remove all the coal,
and the grantors must indemnify him against any damage
resulting from injury to the surface which he may be com-
pelled to pay to the owner thereof. Compare "Noonan v.
Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in State v.
Barrett, 50 S. E. 5o6, that a statute of the state making it
unlawful for any person, etc., other than licensed
Liquor Laws retail dealers to sell or dispose of, for gain, or
to keep for sale, within the county of Union any spirituous,
vinous, malt, or intoxicating liquor, etc., and providing
that the keeping by any person in his possession of liquor
to the quantity of more than one quart, within such county,
shall be prima-facie evidence of his keeping it for sale,
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within the meaning of the act, is not unconstitutional as an
invasion by the legislative of the judicial department of the
government. Nor is it unconstitutional as depriving the
accused of the presumption of innocence, since it is within
the legislative power to change the rules of evidence and
declare that certain facts -or conditions, when shown, shall
constitute prima-facie evidence of guilt. Compare Corm-
inonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray, i.
In view of the Insular Decisions the case of Fred Rass-
mussen v. United States, 25 S. C. R. 514, is of special in-
Jury Trial terest. It is there held by the United States
In Alaska Supreme Court that Alaska was so incorporated
into the United States by the treaty under ivhich it was ac-
quired, and by such subsequent Congressional legislation
as the act of Congress concerning internal revenue taxation,
and the act extending the laws of the United States relating
to customs, commerce, and navigation over Alaska and
establishing a collection district therein, as to render repug-
nant to the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
the provision of an act that in trials for misdemeanors in
Alaska six jurors shall constitute a legal jury. Compare
with this decision Hawaii v. Mankichi, 19o U. S. 197.
In Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Company, 25 S. C. R. 466, the United States Su-
Street preme Court decides that the fact that the only
Assessmenta use made of a lot abutting on a street improve-
ment is for a railway right of way does not make invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, for lack of benefits, an assessment thereon for the
grading, curbing, and paving, made under the area rule.
See Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351.
The United States Supreme Court renders a decision of
great public importance in Lochner v. People of the State
Regulation of New York, 25 S. C. R. 539, where it is de-
of Hoursof cided that the limitation of employment in
Labor bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a
day, attempted by the New York statute law, is an arbi-
trary interference with the freedom to contract guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
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which cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power to protect the public health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare. With this decision should be compared the
previous decision of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, where
legislation limiting the length of time per day during which
miners should work in underground mines or workings
was upheld.
CONTRACTS.
In Edward H. Harriman v. Northern Securities Com-
pany, 25 S. C. R. 493, the United States Supreme Court
In ~p decides that the rule that property delivered un-
Delicto der an illegal contract cannot be recovered back
by parties in pari delicto prevents the original stockholders
in two competing interstate railway companies from re-
claiming the specific shares of stock which they deliver to
a stockholding corporation in exchange for its capital stock,
pursuant to a combination subsequently adjudged illegal,
under which the corporation was to acquire a controlling
interest in the capital stock of each of such railway com-
panies, and they must be content with the ratable distribu-
tion of the corporate assets resolved upon by the stock-
holding corporation. See St. Louis R. Co. v. Terre Haute,
etc., R. Co., 145 U. S. 393.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division;
First Department) decides in Butler v. Wright, 92 N. Y.
spcific Supp. 113, that where defendant agreed to de-
Performance liver to plaintiff certain corporate stock in con-
sideration of shares of the stock of another corporation,
together with the resignations in writing of all the latter's
directors or trustees, on the breach of such contract by de-
fendant plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law for the
recovery of damages, and could not, therefore, sue for
specific performance, though defendant owned ninety-two
per cent. of the stock of the corporation to be delivered to
plaintiff, which stock was not listed on any stock exchange
nor purchasable in the market. One judge dissents. See
Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337.
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In State v. Price, 103 N. W. 195, the Supreme Court of
Iowa decides that under a statute providing that a verdict
Former of not guilty imports an acquittal on every ma-
Acquittal terial allegation in the indictment, an acquittal
under an indictment charging rape on a female under the
age of consent is a bar to a subsequent proceeding under an
indictment charging incest with the same female at the
same time, although in the latter prosecution the state elected
to rely on an act committed on a different date from that
relied on in the prosecution for rape. Two judges dissent.
See and compare State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 583.
EASEMENTS.
In Clark v. Strong, 93 N. Y. Supp, 514, the New York
Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third Department)
FrecoW decides that an instrument conveying the right
Estate to lay pipes over real property, and convey water
from a spring thereon, so long as the grantee or any of his
family occupies certain lands, conveys a freehold estate in
an interest in the land, and is within the statute law, pro-
viding that a grant of a freehold estate not acknowledged
before delivery must be attested by at least one witness in
order to take effect as against a subsequent purchaser.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
The Supreme Court of the United States holds in Lee L.
Clark v. E. J. Nash, 25 S. C. R. 676, that the peculiar local
Public Us. conditions in Utah justify, as authorizing con-
demnation for a public use, a statute of that
state under which an individual landowner may condemn
a right of way across his neighbor's land for the enlarge-
ment of an irrigation ditch therein, in order to enable him
to obtain water from a stream in which he has an interest
to irrigate his land, which otherwise would remain abso-
lutely valueless. See also Fallbrook Irrig. District v. Brad-
ley, 164 U. S. 112.
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
FEDERAL COURTS.
The doctrine of Swift v.Tyson seems to be gaining ground
an(d decisions applying it to new cases are being constantly
Questions of handed down. In Spinks v. Mutual Reserve
Oeneral aw Fund Life Ass'n, 137 Fed. i69, the United
States Circuit.Court, E. D. Kentucky, decides that whether
a provision in an insurance policy that no action shall be
brought after the lapse of a year from the date of insured's
death is valid is one of general public policy, as to which
Federal courts will follow Federal decisions, though in con-
flict with the decisions of the highest courts of the state.
See in connection herewith note -to Wilson v. Perrin, ii C.
C. A. 71.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in J. A.
Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 50 S. E. 65o, that
Preerred the statute of New Jersey declaring that the an-
Debts nual franchise or license fee imposed on corpora-
tions chartered by that state should be a preferred debt in
case of insolvency ,can have no extraterritorial effect, -and
such claim is not entitled to preference in insolvency pro-
ceedings against such corporations in another state. Com-
pare Villitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577
HABEAS CORPUS.
In United States v. Ju Toy, 25 S. C. R. 644, the United
States Supreme Court decides that habeas corpus should not
Chinese be granted in favor of a person of Chinese
Exclusion descent detained for return to China by the.
steamship company which brought him to an American port,
where his petition alleges nothing but citizenship as making
his detention unlawful, and he has been denied admission to
the United States by the immigration officers after examina-
tion, and such denial has been affirmed on appeal by the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Such procedure, it is
held, constitutes due process of law and the judicial power
may not interfere. Compare United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U. S. i61.
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INFANTS.
It is decided by the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Sixth Circuit, in Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137
Citizenship: Fed. 48, that where the father and mother of
Divorce of an infant plaintiff had been divorced, and he
Parents had been 43warded to the custody of his mother,
his domicile and place of citizenship, for the purposes of
the jurisdiction of a Federal court, are determined by hers
so long as he remains with her and in her care; and the
fact of the divorce decree does not prevent her from ac-
quiring citizenship in another state for herself and him. See
Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582.
JUDGMENTS.
The United States Supreme Court holds in Edward
laster v. F. M. Currie, 25 S. C. R. 614, that the refusal of
Pull Faith the Nebraska courts to permit an action to be
and Credit maintained on an Ohio judgment denies the
full faith and credit guaranteed by the Federal Constitution
when based on the alleged fraud in acquiring jurisdiction of
the defendant in the Ohio suit, in that the service of process
therein was only made possible by giving defendant notice
in Nebraska that plaintiff's deposition would be taken in
Ohio for use in an action for the same cause then pending
in Nebraska, in the hope that defendant would attend, and
would delay his return to NebrasKa after the deposition was
taken long enough to permit service. See and compare
Jacobs v. Marks, 182 U. S. 583.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Adelaide A. Harding v. George F. Harding, 25 S. C. R.
Pull Faith 679, that an Illinois decree for the separate
and Credit maintenance of the wife cannot be denied con-
clusiveness in the courts of another state on the question of
her desertion, on the theory that it was rendered by consent,
where to assume that it was a consent decree disregards the
rule of public policy of Illinois and the express terms of the
decree, and gives to the ex parte stipulation of the husband
that the wife was living separate and apart from him without
her fault the effect of a consent to the decree, while the Illi-
nois courts regarded it as an admission concerning the state
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of the proof on the record, which, though rendering it un-
necessary for the court to analyze the proof, did not deprive
it of the power to make a judicial finding of the fact.
JURISDICTION.
The Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the courts of the states to hear and allow dlaims against the
Executors estates of deceased persons which involve con-
and Admninis- troversies over the requisite amounts between
trators citizens of different states, notwithstanding the
fact that the states have by their legislation conferred exclu-
sive jurisdiction to hear and adjudge such claims upon their
probate or other state courts: United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Schurmeier v. Comwcticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137 Fed. 42.
LIMITATIONS.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Cir-
cuit, decides, in Schauble v. Schulz, 137 Fed. 389, that the
Infnts exemptions from the operation of statutes of
limitation usually accorded to infants do not rest
upon any fundamental doctrine of the law, but only upon
express provision therefor in such statutes. It is competent
for the Legislature to put infants and adults upon the same
footing in this respect, and this is the effect of a statute con-
taining no saving cause exempting infants. See Vance v.
Vance, 1O8 U. S. 514.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) decides in Stewart v. Baruch, 93 N. Y. Supp.
Torts of i61, that evidence that defendant was the owner
Servant of the automobile which ran over plaintiff, and
that the chaffeur operating the automobile was employed by
defendant, is sufficient to establish prima facie that the chaf-
feur was acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the collision.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decides
in Shaw v. City of Charleston, 5o S. E. 527, that a munic-
Liabilities: ipal corporation is not liable for injuries to a
Prisons person occasioned by the unsanitary condition of
its prison while he is confined therein for violation of a city
ordinance, the maintenance of such prison being the exercise
of a purely governmental power. See also Gibson v. Hunt-
ington, 38 W. Va. 177.
PLEADING.
In Kinney v. Mitchell, 136 Fed. 773, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, decides that a state-
Afidavltof ment of claim, in form assumpsit, but which
Da ence seeks to recover damages for acts of defendant
done in his judicial capacity, does not set up a cause of action
requiring an affidavit of defence under the Act of Assembly
of the state of Pennsylvania of May 25, 1887 (P. L. 271).
The general rule is laid down that the actions of assumpsit
in which judgment may be taken for want of an affidavit
of defence are limited to such as are founded on contract
alone, and do not include cases in which the cause of action
is ex delicto or of a mixed character of contract and tort.
Compare Corry v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 194 Pa. 516.
RECEIVERS.
The United States Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania, de-
cides in Columbia Nat. Sand Dredging Co. v. Washed Bar
Appointment Sand Dredging Co., 136 Fed. 710, that where
the majority stockholders of a corporation, who
are also the directors, are clearly violating the charter rights
of the minority, as by diverting all the earnings of the com-
pany to themselves, either directly or indirectly, a court of
equity will appoint a receiver at suit of a minority stock-
holder, although the company is solvent, there being no com-
plete, prompt, and efficient remedy at law. See also State of
Montana v. Second Judicial District, 39 Pac. 316.
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RELEASE.
In Grcat Northern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 136 Fed. i18, it
appeared that plaintiff, a railroad brakeman, after being
Vacation: injured, was solicited by defendant's claim agent
Mutual to make a settlement, and went with him to the
Mistake office of defendant's physician, who, after an ex-
amination, either through nlistakb or to deceive complainant,
minimized his injuries, and stated that he would be able to
work in a week or two, whereupon plaintiff, without other
advice, was induced to sign a release of all damages and de-
mands on account of his injuries in consideration of -payment
of doctor's and nurse's bill and his wages for such period of
time. It developed, however, that plaintiff was seriously
injured, requiring a subsequent hazardous and delicate sur-
gical operation on the skull, and that he would probably
never be able to resume his vocation. Under these circum-
stances, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, decides that the release was executed by mutual
mistake of the parties and was subject to vacation. See
Chicago N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, II6 Fed. 913.
SALES.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides in Van Doren
v. Fenton, 103 N. W. 228, that standing timber is real estate
Standing within the rule that there can be no warranty of
Timber title to real estate by parol. It is further held
that there is no implied warranty of title in a sale of standing
timber, it being real estate.
TAXATION.
In Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. R. Co., 25 S.
C. R. 669, it is decided by the Supreme Court of the United
Stock of States that, including in the appraisement of the
Domestic capital stock of a domestic corporation, for pur-
Corporation poses of taxation, under the Pennsylvania taxing
laws, the value of coal mined by it within the state, but situ-
ated in other states, there awaiting sale when the appraise-
ment was made, deprives the* corporation of its property
without process of law. With this decision see and compare
Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200.
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In Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 25 S. C. R. 686, the Supreme Court of the United
Interstate States decides that vessels which, though en-
commerce gaged in interstate commerce, are employed in
such commerce wholly-within the limits of a state, are sub-
ject to taxation in that state, although they may have been
registered or enrolled under the United States statutes at a
port outside the limits of the state. Compare Pullnan Pal-
ace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.-S. x8.
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
A very interesting decision on the question of the use of
one's family name in business occurs in Howe Scale Corn-
Use of pany v. Wyckoff, Scamans & Benedict, 25 S. C.
Family Name R. 6o9, where the Supreme Court of the United
States holds that a manufacturer of typewriters under the
names "Remington" and " Remington Standard" is not
entitled to protection against the adoption by persons bearing
respectively the surnames " Remington" and " SholeS" of
the name" Remington-Sholes" for their typewriters, and the
giving of that name to the corporation formed for their
manufacture and sale, where the only confusion in the minds
of the public as to the original of the product results from
the similarity in names, and not from the manner of their
use. The general rule is laid down that unfair competition
does not arise out of the use in a corporate name of the sur-
names of one or more of the incorporators where such use
by the individuals themselves or in a partnership would not
be open to that charge. See and compare Elgin National
Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665.
